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ABSTRACT
Side-channel risks of Intel SGX have recently attracted great atten-
tion. Under the spotlight is the newly discovered page-fault attack,
in which an OS-level adversary induces page faults to observe the
page-level access patterns of a protected process running in an SGX
enclave. With almost all proposed defense focusing on this attack,
little is known about whether such efforts indeed raise the bar for
the adversary, whether a simple variation of the attack renders
all protection ineffective, not to mention an in-depth understand-
ing of other attack surfaces in the SGX system. In the paper, we
report the first step toward systematic analyses of side-channel
threats that SGX faces, focusing on the risks associated with its
memory management. Our research identifies 8 potential attack
vectors, ranging from TLB to DRAMmodules. More importantly, we
highlight the common misunderstandings about SGX memory side
channels, demonstrating that high frequent AEXs can be avoided
when recovering EdDSA secret key through a new page channel
and fine-grained monitoring of enclave programs (at the level of
64B) can be done through combining both cache and cross-enclave
DRAM channels. Our findings reveal the gap between the ongoing
security research on SGX and its side-channel weaknesses, rede-
fine the side-channel threat model for secure enclaves, and can
provoke a discussion on when to use such a system and how to use
it securely.
1 INTRODUCTION
A grand security challenge today is how to establish a trusted
execution environment (TEE) capable of protecting large-scale,
data-intensive computing. This is critical for the purposes such
as outsourcing analysis of sensitive data (e.g., electronic health
records) to an untrusted cloud. Serving such purposes cannot solely
rely on cryptographic means, for example, fully homomorphic en-
cryption, which is still far too slow to handle the computing task
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of a practical scale. A promising alternative is made possible by
recent hardware progress such as Intel Software Guard Extension
(SGX) [10]. SGX offers protection for data and code with a secure
enclave designed to be resilient to attacks from its host operating
system or even system administrators. Such protection is offered as
a feature of Intel’s mainstream CPUs (i.e., Skylake and Kaby Lake),
and characterized by its small trusted computing base (TCB), includ-
ing just the CPU package, and the potential to scale its performance
with the capability of the processors. However, the simplicity of
the design forces an enclave program to utilize resources (mem-
ory, I/O, etc.) partially or fully controlled by the untrusted OS, and
therefore potentially subjects it to side-channel attacks, in which
the adversary outside the enclave could infer sensitive information
inside from observed operations on the shared resources.
SGX side-channel hazards. Unfortunately, the threat has been
found to be more realistic and serious than thought: prior studies
have shown that an adversary with a full control of the OS can
manipulate the page tables of the code running in the enclave-
mode—a CPUmode protected by SGX—to induce page faults during
its execution; through monitoring the occurrences of the faults in a
relatively noise-free environment created by the adversary, he could
identify the program’s execution trace at the page level, which is
shown to be sufficient for extracting text documents, outlines of
images from popular application libraries [43] and compromising
cryptographic operations [39]. In our paper, we call these attacks
the page-fault side-channel attacks.
Intel’s position on these side-channel attacks offers much food
for thought. They admit that SGX does not defend against four side-
channel attack vectors: power statistics, cachemiss statistics, branch
timing and page accesses via page tables [2]. Facing the security
threats due to these side channels, Intel recommends that “it would
be up to the independent software vendors to design the enclave in
a way that prevents the leaking of side-channel information. [7]”,
though they actually work actively with academia and open source
partners to help mitigate the threats [6].
It is clear, from Intel’s statements, radical hardware changes to
address these side-channel problems (e.g., defeating page-fault side
channels by keeping the entire page tables inside the enclave [16])
are unlikely to happen. As a result, software vendors are left with
the daunting tasks of understanding the security impacts of the
SGX side channels and developing practical techniques to mitigate
the threats when building their SGX applications.
Given the importance of the problem, recent years have already
witnessed mushrooming of the attempts to address SGX side chan-
nel threats [15, 38, 39], for example, by placing sensitive code and
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data within the same page [39], or by detecting page faults through
hardware supports [38] or timed-execution [15]. However, these
studies were primarily targeting the page-fault attacks. Although
the concern about this demonstrated attack vector is certainly jus-
tified, the sole attention on the page-fault attack can be inadequate.
After all, tasking a safe heaven built upon minimum software sup-
port with complicated computing missions (e.g., data-intensive
computing) can potentially open many avenues for inside informa-
tion to trickle out during the interactions with the outside, when
the external help is needed to accomplish the missions. Focusing
on memory alone, we can see not only a program’s virtual memory
management but that its physical memory control are partially or
fully exposed to the untrusted OS, not to mention other system
services an enclave program may require (process management,
I/O, etc.). Even only looking at page tables, we are not sure whether
the known paging attack is the only or the most effective way to
extract sensitive information from the enclave process. In the ab-
sence of a comprehensive understanding of possible attack surfaces,
it is not clear whether all proposed protection, which tends to be
heavyweight and intrusive, can even raise the bar to side-channel
attacks, and whether an adversary can switch to a different tech-
nique or channel, more lightweight and equally effective, to extract
the information these approaches were designed to protect.
Understanding memory side channels. As a first step toward a
comprehensive understanding of side-channel threats software ven-
dors face, in this paper, we focus on memory-related side channels,
which is an important, and arguably the most effective category of
side channels that has ever been studied. Of course, the page-fault
side channel falls in the scope of our discussion. To deepen the
community’s understanding of the memory side-channel attack
surfaces and guide the design of defense mechanisms, we believe
that it is important to make the following three key points: First,
page faults are not the only vector that leaks an enclave program’s
memory access patterns. Any follow-up attempt to mitigate mem-
ory side-channel leaks should take into account the entire attack
surfaces. Second, not every side-channel attack on enclave induces a
large number of Asynchronous Enclave eXits (AEXs) as demonstrated
in the page-fault attacks. This is important because the anomalously
high AEX interrupt rate has been considered to be a key feature
of SGX side-channel attacks, which can be defeated by the protec-
tion designed to capture this signal [15, 38]. Our finding, however,
shows that such interrupt-based protection is fragile, as more so-
phisticated attacks can avoid producing too many interrupts. Third,
it is possible to acquire a fine-grained side-channel observation, at the
cache-line level, into the enclave memory. Hence, defense that places
sensitive code and data on the same page [39] will not be effective
on the new attacks.
In this paper, we hope to get across these messages through the
following research efforts:
• Exploration of memory side-channel attack surfaces. In our research,
we surveyed SGX side-channel attack surfaces involving memory
management, identifying 8 types of side-channel attack vectors
related to address translation caches in CPU hardware (e.g., TLB,
paging-structure caches), page tables located in the main memory,
and the entire cache and DRAM hierarchy. This study takes into
account each step in the address translation and memory operation,
and thus to our knowledge presents the most comprehensive analy-
sis on memory side-channel attack surfaces against SGX enclaves.
• Reducing side effects of memory side-channel attacks. To demon-
strate that a large number of AEXs are not a necessary condition
of memory side-channel attacks, we develop a new memory-based
attack, called sneaky page monitoring (SPM). SPM attacks work by
setting and resetting a page’s accessed flag in the page table entry
(PTE) to monitor when the page is visited. Unlike the page-fault
attacks [43], in which a page fault is generated each time when a
page is accessed, manipulation of the accessed flags does not trigger
any interrupt directly. However, the attack still needs to flush the
translation lookaside buffer (TLB) from time to time by triggering
interrupts to force the CPU to look up page tables and set accessed
flags in the PTEs. Nevertheless, we found that there are several
ways to reduce the number of the interrupts or even completely
eliminate them in such attacks. Particularly, we can avoid tracking
the access patterns between the entry and exit pages of a program
fragment (e.g., a function) and instead, use the execution time mea-
sured between these pages to infer the execution paths in-between.
This approach can still work if all secret-dependent branches are
located in the same page (i.e., a mechanism proposed by [39]), as
long as there is still a timing difference between the executions of
these branches. Further, we present a technique that utilizes Intel’s
HyperThreading capability to flush the TLBs through an attack
process sharing the same CPU core with the enclave code, which
can eliminate the need of interrupts, when HyperThreading is on.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of SPM through attacks on
real-world applications. Particularly, we show that when attacking
EdDSA (Section 4.3), our timing enhancement only triggers 1,300
interrupts, compared with 71,000 caused by the page-fault attack
and 33,000 by the direct accessed flags attack, when recovering the
whole 512-bit secret key. This level of the interrupt rate makes our
attack almost invisible to all known interrupt-based defense [15, 38],
given the fact that even normal execution of the target program
generates thousands of interrupts.
• Improving attack’s spatial granularity. Page-fault attacks allow
attackers to observe the enclave program’s memory access pattern
at the page granularity (4KB), therefore existing solutions propose
to defeat the attacks by aligning sensitive code and data within
the same memory pages. To show that this defense strategy is
ineffective, we demonstrate a series of memory side-channel attacks
that achieve finer spatial granularity, which includes a cross-enclave
Prime+Probe attack, a cross-enclave DRAMA attack, and a novel
cache-DRAM attack. Particularly, the cache-DRAM attack leverages
both Prime+Probe cache attacks and DRAMA attacks to improve
the spatial granularity. When exploiting both channels, we are able
to achieve a fine-grained observation (64B as apposed to 16KB
for Prime+Probe and ≥1KB for the DRAMA attack alone), which
enables us to monitor the execution flows of an enclave program
(similar to Flush+Reload attacks). Note that this cannot be done
at the cache level since in our case the attacker does not share
code with the target enclave program, which makes Flush+Reload
impossible.
Implications. Our findings point to the disturbing lack of under-
standing about potential attack surfaces in SGX, which can have a
serious consequence. Not only are all existing defense mechanisms
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vulnerable to the new attacks we developed, but some of them only
marginally increase the cost on the attacker side: as demonstrated
in our study, for the channels on the virtual memory, the page-fault
attack is not the most cost-effective one and a large number of AEX
interrupts are not necessary for a successful attack; all existing
protection does not add much burden to a more sophisticated at-
tacker, who can effectively reduce the frequency of AEXs without
undermining the effectiveness of the attack. Most importantly, we
hope that our study can lead to rethinking the security limitations
of SGX and similar TEE technologies, provoking a discussion on
when to use them and how to use them properly.
Contributions. In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• The first in-depth study on SGX memory side-channel attack sur-
faces. Although only focusing on the memory management, our
study reveals new channels that disclose information of the enclave,
particularly accessed flags, timing and cross-enclave channels.
• New attacks. We developed a suite of new attack techniques that
exploit these new channels. Particularly, we showmultiple channels
can complement each other to enhance the effectiveness of an at-
tack: timing+accessed flags to reduce AEXs (rendering existing pro-
tection less effective) and DRAM+Cache to achieve a fine-grained
observation into the enclave (64B).
• New understanding. We discuss possible mitigations of the new
threats and highlight the importance of a better understanding of
the limitations of SGX-like technologies.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Memory Isolation in Intel SGX
Memory isolation of enclave programs is a key design feature of
Intel SGX. To maintain backward-compatibility, Intel implements
such isolation via extensions to existing processor architectures,
which we introduce below.
Virtual and physicalmemorymanagement. Intel SGX reserves
a range of continuous physical memory exclusively for enclave
programs and their control structures, dubbed Processor Reserved
Memory (PRM). The extended memory management units (MMU)
of the CPU prevents accesses to the PRM from all programs outside
enclaves, including the OS kernel, virtual machine hypervisors,
SMM code or Direct Memory Accesses (DMA). Enclave Page Cache
(EPC) is a subset of the PRM memory range. The EPC is divided
to pages of 4KBs and managed similarly as the rest of the physical
memory pages. Each EPC page can be allocated to one enclave at
one time.
The virtual memory space of each program has an Enclave Lin-
ear Address Range (ELRANGE), which is reserved for enclaves and
mapped to the EPC pages. Sensitive code and data is stored within
the ELRANGE. Page tables responsible for translating virtual ad-
dresses to physical addresses are managed by the untrusted system
software. The translation lookaside buffer (TLB) works for EPC
pages in traditional ways. When the CPU transitions between non-
enclave mode and enclave mode, through EENTER or EEXIT instruc-
tions or Asynchronous Enclave Exits (AEXs), TLB entries associated
with the current Process-Context Identifier (PCID) as well as the
global identifier are flushed, preventing non-enclave code learning
information about address translation inside the enclaves.
Security check for memory isolation. To prevent system soft-
ware from arbitrarily controlling the address translation by manipu-
lating the page table entries, the CPU also consults the Enclave Page
Cache Map (EPCM) during the address translation. Each EPC page
corresponds to an entry in the EPCM, which records the owner
enclave of the EPC page, the type of the page, and a valid bit indi-
cating whether the page has been allocated. When an EPC page is
allocated, its access permissions are specified in its EPCM entry as
readable, writable, and/or executable. The virtual address (within
ELRANGE) mapped to the EPC page is also recorded in the EPCM
entry.
Correctness of page table entries set up by the untrusted system
software is guaranteed by an extended Page Miss Handler (PMH).
When the code is executing in the enclave mode or the address
translation result falls into the PRM range, additional security check
will take place. Specially, when the code is running in the non-
enclave mode and address translation falls into the PRM range, or
the code runs in the enclave mode but the physical address is not
pointing to a regular EPC page belonging to the current enclave, or
the virtual address triggering the page table walk doesn’t match the
virtual address recorded in the corresponding entry in the EPCM,
a page fault will occur. Otherwise, the generated TLB entries will
be set according to both the attributes in the EPCM entry and the
page table entry.
Memory encryption. To support larger ELRANGE than EPC, EPC
pages can be “swapped” out to regular physical memory. This pro-
cedure is called EPC page eviction. The confidentiality and integrity
of the evicted pages are guaranteed through authenticated encryp-
tion. The hardware Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) is integrated
with the memory controller and seamlessly encrypts the content
of the EPC page that is evicted to a regular physical memory page.
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) protects the integrity of
the encryption and a nonce associated with the evicted page. The
encrypted page can be stored in the main memory or swapped out
to secondary storage similar to regular pages. But the metadata
associated with the encryption needs to be kept by the system
software properly for the page to be “swapped” into the EPC again.
2.2 Adversary Model
In this paper, we consider attacks against enclave-protected code
and data. The system software here refers to the program that
operates with system privileges, such as operating systems and
hypervisors. Our focus in this paper is side-channel analysis that
threatens the confidentiality of the enclave programs. As such,
software bugs in the code of an enclave program are out of our
scope. Moreover, side channels not involving memory management
and address translation are not covered either.
We assume in our demonstrated attacks knowledge of the victim
binary code to be loaded into the enclave. As the adversary also
knows the base address of the enclave binary in the virtual address
space, as well as the entire virtual-to-physical mapping, the map-
ping of the binary code in pages, caches, DRAMs can be derived.
Source code of the victim program is NOT required. We conducted
analysis and experiments on real SGX platforms. So we do assume
the adversary has access to a machine of the same configuration
before performing the attacks.
3
3 UNDERSTANDING ATTACK SURFACES
In this section, we explore side-channel attack surfaces in SGX
memory management, through an in-depth study of attack vectors
(shared resources that allow interference of the execution inside
enclaves), followed by an analysis of individual vectors, in terms of
the way they can be exploited and effectiveness of the attacks.
3.1 Attack Vectors
Amemory reference in the modern Intel CPU architectures involves
a sequence of micro-operations: the virtual address generated by the
program is translated into the physical address, by first consulting
a set of address translation caches (e.g., TLBs and various paging-
structure caches) and then walking through the page tables in the
memory. The resulting physical address is then used to access the
cache (e.g., L1, L2, L3) and DRAM to complete thememory reference.
Here, we discuss memory side-channel attack vectors in each of
these steps.
Address TranslationCaches.Address translation caches are hard-
ware caches that facilitate address translation, including TLBs and
various paging-structure caches. TLB is a multi-level set-associative
hardware cache that temporarily stores the translation from virtual
page numbers to physical page numbers. Specially, the virtual ad-
dress is first divided into three components: TLB tag bits, TLB-index
bits, and page-offset bits. The TLB-index bits are used to index a
set-associative TLB and the TLB-tag bits are used to match the
tags in each of the TLB entries of the searched TLB set. Similar
to L1 caches, the L1 TLB for data and instructions are split into
dTLB and iTLB. An L2 TLB, typically larger and unified, will be
searched upon L1 TLB misses. Recent Intel processors allow selec-
tively flushing TLB entries at context switch. This is enabled by the
Process-Context Identifier (PCID) field in the TLB entries to avoid
flushing the entries that will be used again. If both levels of TLBs
miss, a page table walk will be initiated. The virtual page number
is divided into, according to Intel’s terminology, PML4 bits, PDPTE
bits, PDE bits, and PTE bits, each of which is responsible for index-
ing one level of page tables in the main memory. Due to the long
latency of page-table walks, if the processor is also equipped with
paging structure caches, such as PML4 cache, PDPTE cache, PDE
cache, these hardware caches will also be searched to accelerate
the page-table walk. The PTEs can be first searched in the cache
hierarchy before the memory access [11].
Vector 1. Shared TLBs and paging-structure caches under Hy-
perThreading.
When HyperThreading (HT)1 is enabled, code running in the
enclave mode may share the same set of TLBs and paging-structure
caches with code running in non-enclave mode. Therefore, the
enclave code’s use of such resources will interfere with that of
the non-enclave code, creating side channels. This attack vector is
utilized to clear the TLB entries in the HT-SPM attack (Section 4.1).
Vector 2. Flushing selected entries in TLB and paging-structure
caches at AEX.
According to recent versions of Intel Software Developer’s Man-
ual [3], entering and leaving the enclave mode will flush entries
in TLB and paging-structure caches that are associated with the
1Intel’s term for Simultaneous Multi-Threading.
Figure 1: Page table entries.
current PCID. As such, it enables an adversary from a different
process context to infer the flushed entries at context switch. This
is possible even on processors without HT. However, we were not
able to confirm this attack vector on the machines we had (i.e.,
Skylake i7-6700). We conjecture that this is because our Skylake i7-
6700 follows the specification in an older version of Intel Software
Developer’s Manual [4], which states all entries will be flushed re-
gardless of the process context. Nevertheless, we believe this attack
vector could be present in future processors.
Vector 3. Referenced PTEs are cached as data.
Beside paging-structure caches, referenced PTEs will also be
cached as regular data [11]. This artifact enables a new attack vec-
tor: by exploiting the Flush+Reload side channel on the monitored
PTEs, the adversary can perform a cross-core attack to trace the
page-level memory access pattern of the enclave code. This at-
tack vector presents a timing-channel version of the sneaky page
monitoring attack we describe in Section 4. We will discuss its
implication in Section 6.
Page tables. Page tables are multi-level data structures stored in
main memory, serving address translation. Every page-table walk
involves multiple memory accesses. Different from regular memory
accesses, page-table lookups are triggered by the micro-code of the
processor direction, without involving the re-ordering buffer [11].
The entry of each level stores the pointer to (i.e., physical address
of) the memory page that contains the next level of the page table.
The structure of a PTE is shown in Figure 1. Specially, bit 0 is present
flag, indicating whether a physical page has been mapped to the
virtual page; bit 5 is accessed flag, which is set by the processor
every time the page-table walk leads to the reference of this page
table entry; bit 6 is dirty flag, which is set when the corresponding
page has been updated. Page frame reclaiming algorithms rely on
the dirty flag to make frame reclamation decisions.
As the page tables are located inside the OS kernel and controlled
by the untrusted system software, they can be manipulated to at-
tack enclaves. However, as mentioned earlier, because the EPC page
permission is also protected by EPCM, malicious system software
cannot arbitrarily manipulate the EPC pages to compromise its in-
tegrity and confidentiality. However, it has been shown in previous
work [43] that by clearing the present flag in the corresponding
PTEs, the malicious system software can collect traces of page
accesses from the enclave programs, inferring secret-dependent
control flows or data flows. Nevertheless, setting present flag is not
the only attack vector against enclave programs.
Vector 4. Updates of the accessed flags in enclave mode.
When the page-table walk results in a reference of the PTE, the
accessed flag of the entry will be set to 1. As such, code run in
non-enclave mode will be able to detect the page table updates and
learn that the corresponding EPC page has just been visited by
the enclave code. However, page-table walk will also update TLB
entries, so that future references to the same page will not update
the accessed flags in PTEs, until the TLB entries are evicted by other
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address translation activities. We exploit this attack vector in our
SPM attacks in Section 4.
Vector 5. Updates of the dirty flags in enclave mode.
Similar to accessed flags, the dirty flag will be updated when
the corresponding EPC page is modified by the enclave program.
This artifact can be exploited to detect memory writes to a new
page. The new side-channel attack vector will enable the adversary
to monitor secret-dependent memory writes, potentially a finer-
grained inference attack than memory access tracking.
Vector 6. Page faults triggered in enclave mode.
In addition to the present flag, a few other bits in the PTEs can be
exploited to trigger page faults. For example, on a x86-64 processor,
bitM to bit 51 are reserved bits which when set will trigger page
fault upon address translation. Here bitM−1 is the highest bit of the
physical address on the machine. The NX flag, when set, will force
page faults when instructions are fetched from the corresponding
EPC page.
Cache and memory hierarchy. Once the virtual address is trans-
lated into the physical address, the memory reference will be served
from the cache and memory hierarchy. Both are temporary stor-
age that only hold data when the power is on. On the top of the
hierarchy is the separate L1 data and instruction caches, the next
level is the unified L2 cache dedicated to one CPU core, then L3
cache shared by all cores of the CPU package, then the main mem-
ory. Caches are typically built on Static Random-Access Memory
(SRAM) and the main memory on Dynamic Random-Access Mem-
ory (DRAM). The upper level storage tends to be smaller, faster
and more expensive, while the lower level storage is usually larger,
slower and a lot cheaper. Memory fetch goes through each level
from top to bottom; misses in the upper level will lead to accesses to
the next level. Data or code fetched from lower levels usually update
entries in the upper level in order to speed up future references.
The main memory is generally organized in multiple memory
channels, handled by memory controllers. One memory channel is
physically partitioned into multiple DIMMs (Dual In-line Memory
Module), each with one or two ranks. Each rank has several DRAM
chips (e.g., 8 or 16), and is also partitioned into multiple banks. A
bank carries the memory arrays organized in rows and each of the
rows typically has a size of 8KB, shared by multiple 4KB memory
pages since one page tends to span over multiple rows. Also on
the bank is a row buffer that keeps the most recently accessed row.
Every memory read will load the entire row into the row buffer
before thememory request is served. As such, accesses to the DRAM
row already in the row buffer are much faster.
Vector 7. CPU caches are shared between code in enclave and
non-enclave mode.
SGX does not protect enclave against cache side-channel attacks.
Therefore, all levels of caches are shared between code in enclave
mode and non-enclave mode, similar to cross-process and cross-
VM cache sharing that are well-known side-channel attack vectors.
Therefore, all known cache side-channel attacks, including those
on L1 data cache, L1 instruction cache, and L3 cache, all apply
to the enclave settings. We empirically confirmed such threats
(Section 5.1).
Vector 8. The entire memory hierarchy, including memory con-
trollers, channels, DIMMs, DRAM ranks and banks (including row
buffers), are shared between code in enclave and non-enclave mode.
Similar to cache sharing, DRAM modules are shared by all pro-
cesses running in the computer systems. Therefore, it is unavoid-
able to have enclave code and non-enclave code accessing memory
stored in the same DRAM bank. The DRAM row buffer can be
served as a side-channel attack vector: when the target program
makes a memory reference, the corresponding DRAM row will
be loaded into the row buffer of the bank; the adversary can com-
pare the row-access time to detect whether a specific row has just
been visited, so as to infer the target’s memory access. This artifact
has been exploited in DRAMA attacks [36]. In Section 5, we show
that after key technical challenges are addressed, such attacks can
also succeed on enclave programs. Other shared memory hierarchy
can also create contention between enclave and non-enclave code,
causing interference that may lead to covert channels [27].
3.2 Characterizing Memory Vectors
Here we characterize the aforementioned memory side-channels
in three dimensions:
Spatial granularity. This concept describes the smallest unit of
information directly observable to the adversary during a memory
side-channel attack. Specifically, it measures the size of the address
space one side-channel observation could not reveal. For example,
the spatial granularity of the page-fault attack is 4KB, indicating
that every fault enables the adversary to see one memory page
(4096 bytes) being touched, though the exact address visited is not
directly disclosed.
Temporal observability. Given a spatial granularity level, even
though the adversary cannot directly see what happens inside the
smallest information unit, still there can be timing signals generated
during the execution of the target program to help distinguish
different accessesmade by the programwithin the unit. For example,
the duration for a program to stay on a page indicates, indirectly,
whether a single memory or multiple accesses occur. A side-channel
is said to have this property if the timing is measured and used to
refine the observations in the attack.
Side effects. We use this concept to characterize observable anom-
alies caused by a memory side-channel attack, which could be
employed to detect the attack. An example is AEX, which is fre-
quently invoked by the page-fault attack. Another side effect is the
slowdown of the execution. Since the primary approach to con-
ducting a side-channel attack is to cause contention in memory
resource, such as the flush of caches, TLBs, paging structure caches,
DRAM row buffers, etc., overheads will be introduced to the run-
time performance of the enclave code. AEXs also contribute to the
performance overhead. For example, the original page-fault attacks
are reported to make the target program run one or two orders of
magnitude slower. This level of slowdown is easy to get noticed.
Frequent AEXs are also detectable using approaches proposed by
Chen et al. [15], as the execution time between two basic blocks
can be much longer.
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Figure 2: Basic SPM attack.
4 REDUCING SIDE EFFECTS WITH SNEAKY
PAGE MONITORING ATTACKS
To attack the virtualmemory, a page-fault side-channel attacker first
restricts access to all pages, which induces page faults whenever
the enclave process touches any of these pages, thereby generating
a sequence of its page visits. A problem here is that this approach
is heavyweight, causing an interrupt for each page access. This
often leads to a performance slowdown by one or two orders of
magnitude [43]. As a result, such an attack could be detected by
looking at its extremely high frequency of page faults (i.e., AEXs)
and anomalously low performance observed from the remote. All
existing solutions, except those requiring hardware changes, are
either leveraging interrupts or trying to remove the page trace of
a program (e.g., putting all the code on one page). Little has been
done to question whether such defense is sufficient.
To show that excessive AEXs are not the necessary condition to
conducting memory side-channel attack, in this section, we elabo-
rate sneaky page monitoring (SPM), a new paging attack that can
achieve comparable effectiveness with much less frequent AEXs.
4.1 The Three SPM Attacks (Vector 4)
In this section, we introduce three types of SPM attacks, which
monitor the page table entries and exploit different techniques to
flush TLBs.
B-SPM: Accessed Flags Monitoring. The SPM attack manipu-
lates and monitors the accessed flags on the pages of an enclave
process to identify its execution trace. Specifically, we run a system-
level attack process outside an enclave to repeatedly inspect each
page table entry’s accessed flag, record when it is set (from 0 to 1)
and reset it once this happens. The page-access trace recovered in
this way is a sequence of page sets, each of which is a group of pages
visited (with their accessed flags set to 1) between two consecutive
inspections. This attack is lightweight since it does not need any
AEX to observe the pages first time when they are visited.
However, as mentioned earlier, after a virtual address is trans-
lated, its page number is automatically added to a TLB. As a result,
the accessed flag of that page will not be set again when the page is
visited later. To force the processor to access the PTE (and update
the flag), the attacker has to invalidate the TLB entry proactively.
The simplest way to do so is by generating an inter-processor in-
terrupt (IPI) from a different CPU core to trigger a TLB shootdown,
which causes an AEX from the enclave, resulting in flushing of
condition
= true?
Path_A Path_B1
BB0
BB1 BB2
Path_B2 BB3
page
Figure 3: An example of secret-dependent branch leaking
timing information.
all TLB entries of the current PCID. Figure 2 illustrates this attack,
which we call basic SPM or B-SPM.
This B-SPM attack still involves interrupts but is already much
more lightweight than the page-fault attack: TLB shootdowns are
typically less expensive than page faults; more importantly, B-SPM
only triggers interrupts when visiting the same page needs to be
observed again, while the latter needs to trigger an interrupt for
every (new) page access.
In terms of accuracy, the page-fault attack tends to have a finer-
grained observation while B-SPM attack cannot differentiate the
visiting order of two pages that are spotted during the same round
of inspections. However B-SPM attack strives for a balance between
the interrupt rate and attack resolutions.
T-SPM: Timing enhancement. When repeated visits to same
pages become a salient feature for an input, the basic SPM needs to
issue more TLB shootdowns in order to observe the feature, making
the attack observable to the existing protections that detect the
anomalous interrupt rate [15, 38]. Figure 3 illustrates an example, in
which the secret-dependent code resides in the same page, except
that the execution on one condition involves a loop while that on
the other does not, leading to different execution time. In this case,
TLB shootdowns during the execution of the loop are required to
distinguish two branches using page visit traces (i.e. number of
page visits). To reduce the number of the interrupts, we leverage a
timing channel to enhance SPM, making it stealthier. Specifically,
given a code fragment with a unique entry page α and a unique
exit page β , together with multiple input-dependent paths between
the two points on different pages, our timing-enhanced SPM (called
T-SPM) continuously monitors α and β , measuring the execution
time between these two points, and once the accessed flag of β is
found to be set, flushes the TLB and resets the accessed flags for
both PTEs. The timing recorded is then used to infer the input of
the code fragment.
This simple approach avoids all the interrupts between α and
β , but still reveals the possible execution path connecting them.
In the extreme case, when all other code stays on the same page,
as proposed by the prior research [39] to defend against page-
fault attacks, T-SPM can still infer sensitive information when the
operations on them take different time to complete.
HT-SPM: TLB Flushing throughHyperThreading. Further we
found that when HyperThreading is turned on for a processor, we
can clear up the TLBs without issuing TLB shootdowns, which
renders all existing interrupt-based protection ineffective. Hyper-
Threading runs two virtual cores on a physical core to handle the
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Table 1: Configuration of the testbed, available per logical
core when HyperThreading is enabled.
Size Sets ×Ways
iTLB 64 8 × 8
dTLB 64 16 × 4
L2 TLB 1536 128 × 12
iCache 32KB 64 × 8
dCache 32KB 64 × 8
L2 Cache 256KB 1024 × 4
L3 Cache 8MB 8192 × 16
Size Channel × DIMMs × Ranks × Banks × Rows
DRAM 8GB×2 2 × 1 × 2 × 16 × 215
workloads from two different OS processes. This resource-sharing
is transparent to the OS and therefore does not trigger any inter-
rupt. The processes running on the two virtual cores share some of
the TLBs, which allows the attacker to remove some TLB entries
outside the enclave, without causing any interrupts. As a result,
in the presence of HyperThreading, we can run an attack process
together with an enclave process, to continuously probe the virtual
addresses in conflict with the TLB entries the latter uses, in an
attempt to evict these entries and force the victim process to walk
its page tables. Using this technique, which we call HT-SPM, we
can remove most or even eliminate the interrupts during an attack.
4.2 Evaluation of Effectiveness
Our analysis was performed on anDell Optiplex 7040with a Skylake
i7-6700 processor and 4 physical cores, with 16GB memory. The
configuration of the cache and memory hierarchy is shown in
Table 1. It runs Ubuntu 16.04 with kernel version 4.2.8. During
our experiments, we patched the OS when necessary to facilitate
the attacks, as an OS-level adversary would do. We used the latest
Graphene-SGX Library OS [5, 41] compiled using GCC 5.4.0 with
default compiling options to port unmodified libraries.
B-SPM on Hunspell. Hunspell is a popular spell checking tool
used by software packages like Apple’s OS X and Google Chrome.
It stores a dictionary in a hash table, which uses linked lists to link
the words with the same hash values. Each linked list spans across
multiple pages, so searching for a word often generates a unique
page-visit sequence. Prior study [43] shows that bymonitoring page
faults, the attacker outside an enclave can fingerprint the dictionary
lookup function inside the enclave, and further determine the word
being checked from the sequence of accessing different data pages
(for storing the dictionary). In our research, we evaluated B-SPM on
Hunspell 1.3.3 and found that the invocation of its spell function
(looking up for one word) can be determined by the access of a
specific page, which can be reliably identified at the inspection
rate (for an attack process running on a separate core) of once
per 184 CPU cycles. For simplicity, our attack process issues a
TLB shootdown once the function invocation is discovered. In the
interrupt, the process inspects the PTEs of pages being monitored
to identify the searched word and resets their accessed flags, and
then monitors the occurrence of the next function invocation. This
approach identifies all the iterative lookups for multiple words.
Like the prior research [43], we also evaluated our attack using
the en_US Hunspell dictionary, as illustrated in Table 2. To compare
with the page-fault attack, we re-implemented it and ran it against
Table 2: Words distribution in the en_US Hunspell dictio-
nary.
group size Page-fault based Accessed-flag basedwords % words %
1 51599 83.05 45649 73.47
2 7586 12.21 8524 13.72
3 2073 3.34 3027 4.87
4 568 0.91 1596 2.57
5 200 0.32 980 1.58
6 60 0.10 810 1.30
7 35 0.06 476 0.77
8 8 0.01 448 0.72
9 0 0 306 0.49
10 0 0 140 0.23
> 10 0 0 173 0.28
Table 3: Features used in Freetype experiment.
trigger page 0x0005B000
α -β pairs
0005B000, 0005B000
0005B000, 00065000
0005B000, 0005E000
00065000, 00022000
0005E000, 00018000
the same data-set, whose results are shown in Table 2. As we can see
here, the effectiveness of B-SPM is in line with that of the known
attack: e.g., the percentage of the uniquely-identifiable words (i.e.,
group size 1) is 73.47% in our attack, a little below 83.05% observed in
the page-fault attack; more than 92% of the words are in group size
less than or equal to 3, compared with 98.6% in the page-fault attack.
When it comes to performance, however, B-SPM runs much faster:
for 62,129 word look-ups it slowed down the original program by
a factor of 5.1×, while the existing attack incurred an overhead of
1214.9×. Note that the prior research reports a slowdown of 25.1×
for 39,719 word look-ups over the SGX emulator [43]. In our study,
however, we ran both experiments on the real SGX platform.
T-SPM on FreeType. FreeType is a font library that converts text
content (the input) into images, which has been used by Linux, An-
droid and iOS and other software packages. In our research, we ran
T-SPM on its TrueType font rendering function, as did in the prior
study [43]. The function, TT_load_Glyph, takes a letter’s glyph
as its input to construct its bitmap. The prior study fingerprints
the start and the end of the function, and selects a set of pages
in-between and uses the number of page faults observed on these
pages to determine the letter being rendered. In our research, we uti-
lize a trigger page to identify the execution of the TT_load_Glyph
function and then within the function, select 5 different α-β pairs
along its control-flow graph as features for identifying the 26 al-
phabet and the space between words (see Table 3). Each feature,
the timing between its α and β points, can separate some of these
27 letters from others. Collectively, they form a feature vector over
which we run a Random Forest Classifier (with number of estima-
tors set as 400) to classify an observed execution of TT_load_Glyph
into one of these letters.
We ran our experiment on FreeType 2.5.3 within an enclave
and collected 250 samples of a 1000 character paragraph from the
book The Princess and the Goblin as a training set for the Random
Forest Classifier. Then we tested on a 1000 character paragraph
7
Table 4: T-SPM attack on Freetype 2.5.3: for example, we
achieved a precision of 69.90% over a coverage of 100% char-
acters.
coverage 100% 88.17% 75.62% 69.14% 57.35%
precision 69.90% 75.25% 80.66% 84.45% 89.94%
from The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, as is used in the prior study [43].
Based upon the timing vectors observed in the experiments (with
an inspection rate of once per 482 cycles), our classifier correctly
identified 57.35% of the characters with a precision of 89.94% and
100% of the characters with a precision of 69.90% (see Table 4).
Particularly, all space characters were correctly identified with no
false positives. 72.14% of the words were correctly recovered by
running a dictionary spelling check. Compared with the page-fault
attack, which captured 100% of the words, T-SPM is less accurate
but much more efficient: it incurred an overhead of 16%, while our
re-implemented page-fault attack caused the program to slow down
by a factor of 252×.
HT-SPM on Hunspell. As an example, we ran HT-SPM on Hun-
spell, in a scenario when a set of words were queried on the dictio-
nary. We conducted the experiments on the Intel Skylake i7-6700
processor, which is characterized by multi-level TLBs (see Table 1).
The experiments show that the dTLB and L2 TLB are fully shared
across logical cores. Our attack process includes 6 threads: 2 cleaners
operating on the same physical core as the Hunspell process in the
enclave for evicting its TLB entries and 4 collectors for inspecting
the accessed flags of memory pages. The cleaners probed all 64 and
1536 entries of the dTLB and L2 TLB every 4978 cycles and the col-
lectors inspected the PTEs once every 128 cycles. In the experiment,
we let Hunspell check 100 words inside the enclave, with the attack
process running outside. The collectors, once seeing the fingerprint
of the spell function, continuously gathered traces for data-page
visits, from which we successfully recovered the exact page visit
set for 88 words. The attack incurred a slowdown of 39.1% and did
not fire a single TLB shootdown.
4.3 Silent Attacks on EdDSA
To understand the stealthiness of different attacks, in terms of their
AEX frequency (which are used by the prior research to detect page
side-channel attacks [15, 38]), we ran the page-fault attack, B-SPM
and T-SPM against the latest version of Libgcrypt (v1.7.6) to recover
the EdDSA session keys2. Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algo-
rithm (EdDSA) [13] is a high-speed high-security digital signature
scheme over twisted Edwards curves. The security of EdDSA is
based on the difficulty of the well-known elliptic curve discrete log-
arithm problem: given points P and Q on a curve to find an integer
a, if it exists, such that Q = aP . Provided the security parameters b
and a cryptographic hash function H producing 2b-bit output, an
EdDSA secret is a b-bit string k , and a = H (k) is also private. The
corresponding public key is A = sB, with B the base point and s
the least significant b bits of a. Let r be the private session key, the
signature of a message M under k is a 2b-bit string (R, S), where
R = rB and S = (r + H (R,A,M)a) mod l . It can be seen that if r
2The attacks only involve code pages, while HT-SPM is designed to reduce AEXs for
data pages. As such, HT-SPM is not presented in the comparison.
1 void
2 _gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (mpi_point_t result ,
3 gcry_mpi_t scalar , mpi_point_t point ,
4 mpi_ec_t ctx) {
5 if (ctx ->model == MPI_EC_EDWARDS
6 || (ctx ->model == MPI_EC_WEIERSTRASS
7 && mpi_is_secure (scalar))) {
8 if (mpi_is_secure (scalar)) {
9 /* If SCALAR is in secure memory we assume that it is the
secret key we use constant time operation. */
10 ...
11 }
12 else {
13 for (j=nbits -1; j >= 0; j--) {
14 _gcry_mpi_ec_dup_point (result , result , ctx);
15 if (mpi_test_bit (scalar , j))
16 _gcry_mpi_ec_add_points (result , result , point , ctx);
17 }
18 }
19 return;
20 }
21 }
Figure 4: Scalar point multiplication for ECC.
Table 5: Attack summary on EdDSA (Libgcrypt 1.7.5). A nor-
mal execution of EdDSA signature without attack also in-
curs over 1500 AEXs.
Monitored pages Number of AEXs
Page fault attack 000E7000, 000E8000 71,000000F0000, 000F1000
B-SPM attack 000EF000 (trigger page) 33,000000E9000, 000F0000
T-SPM attack 000F0000 (trigger page) 1,300000F1000 (trigger page)
is disclosed, assuming H (R,A,M) mod l , 0, the long-term secret
key a can be directly obtained as a = (S − r )/H (R,A,M) mod l .
Figure 4 presents the main function for ECC scalar point multi-
plication. Although Libgcrypt provides side-channel protection by
tagging the long-term private key as “secure memory”, we found
that it does not protect the secret session key. As a result, the non-
hardened branch of line 13-17 is always taken while generating
the message signature. Then the secret-dependent i f -branch can
leak out session key information. We present our evaluation results
using page fault attack, B-SPM and T-SPM respectively, as follows:
Page-fault attacks. During an offline analysis, we generated the
sub-function call traces for both _gcry_mpi_ec_dup_point (Line
14 of Figure 4) and _gcry_mpi_ec_add_points (Line 16, a neces-
sary condition for bit 1), from which we identified 4 code pages to
be monitored, including _gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point on one page,
_gcry_mpi_ec_add_points and _gcry_mpi_ec_dup_point on an-
other page, their related functions on the third page and _gcry_
mpi_test_bit on the last page, whose execution indicates the end
of the processing on the current bit. During the attack, we inter-
cepted the page fault handler in our kernel module and restricted
accesses to these monitored pages by clearing their present bits.
Once a page fault on a monitored page occurred we reset its present
bit and recorded the current count of page faults. We found that for
key bit 1 and 0, there are 89 and 48 subsequent page visits respec-
tively. In total around 71,000 page faults were triggered to correctly
recover all the session key bits.
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B-SPM attacks.We found that the aforementioned code page set is
visited for both key bit 1 and 0, if we do not flush the TLB. Therefore,
the spying thread needs to interrupt the target enclave thread and
clean up the current TLB to get more detailed information about
page visits to differentiate the key bit with different values. To re-
duce the frequency of the interrupts needed, instead of sending IPIs
with fixed time interval, the spying thread runs simultaneously with
the target thread and monitors a trigger page containing ec_pow2
and ec_mul2. Whenever the trigger page is accessed, the spying
thread interrupts the target thread to shoot down the TLB, and
then identifies whether two other pages in the page set (000E9000
and 000F0000 in Table 5) are visited between two interrupts. We
observed a clear difference in the page traces for key bit 1 and 0
and can recover all key bits during the post-processing phase. In
total around 33,000 interrupts were triggered to correctly recover
all the session key bits.
T-SPM attacks. To further reduce the AEX frequency, we moni-
tor the 2 pages containing _gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point and _gcry_
mpi_ec_dup_point/_gcry_mpi_ec_add_points respectively and
utilize the time between the visits to both pages to find out the value
of the current key bit. Specifically, once both of them are found to be
accessed, our attack process starts the timer (using rdtsc) but waits
for 2000 nanoseconds to ensure that the execution of the target pro-
cess leaves both pages, before shooting down the TLB and resetting
the accessed flags of both pages. The timer stops when both pages
are observed again. In this way, only about 2 interrupts are needed
for collecting information for each key bit. The recorded timings
turn out to be differentiating enough to determine whether_gcry_
mpi_ec_dup_point or _gcry_mpi_ec_add_points has been exe-
cuted, around 19,700 cpu cycles for the former and 27,900 cpu cycles
for the latter. After all the call traces are gathered, we can figure
out that the current key bit is 1 when _gcry_mpi_ec_add_points
is observed right after _gcry_mpi_ec_dup_point, and 0 if only
_gcry_mpi_ec_dup_point is seen. In total around 1,300 interrupts
were triggered to correctly recover all the session key bits.
In summary, we found that these three attacks all are able to re-
cover the full EdDSA session key reliably. Page fault attack triggers
a page fault for every page observation and produces about 71,000
AEXs. The B-SPM attack can observe the page visit set between two
consecutive inspections. However it still needs to aggressively send
IPIs to clear TLB entries to gain timely observation of the pages vis-
ited, which produces about 33,000 AEXs. T-SPM attack only issues a
TLB shootdown for every invocation of _gcry_mpi_ec_dup_point
or _gcry_mpi_ec_add_points and differentiates between the two
functions using timing information. As such, it generates a min-
imum number of AEXs. We noticed that a normal execution of
the EdDSA program also incurs at least 1,500 AEXs. The OS at-
tacker could reduce the number of additional AEXs (e.g., only 1300
AEXs for T-SPM in the demonstrated example) caused by normal
page faults and interrupts, and therefore make the T-SPM attack
unobservable.
5 IMPROVING SPATIAL GRANULARITY
WITH CACHE-DRAM ATTACKS
Page-fault side-channel attacks (and also the sneaky page monitor-
ing attacks described in the previous section) only allow attackers
to learn the enclave program’s memory access patterns at a page
granularity. Therefore, mechanisms that mix sensitive code and
data into the same pages have been proposed to defeat such at-
tacks [39]. Intel also recommends “aligning specific code and data
blocks to exist entirely within a single page.” [7]. However, the
effectiveness of this defense method is heavily conditioned on the
fact that page granularity is the best spatial granularity achievable
by the adversary. However, our study suggests it is not the case.
In this section, we demonstrate three attack methods to show
that a powerful adversary is able to improve spatial granularity
significantly. Particularly, we will demonstrate a cross-enclave
Prime+Probe cache attack, a cross-enclave DRAMA attack, and
a cache-DRAM attack. Because SGX do not allow memory shar-
ing between enclaves, the Flush+Reload cache attacks that can
achieve cache-line granularity cannot be conducted against secure
enclaves. However, we show that the cache-DRAM attack is capable
of achieving the same level of spatial granularity against enclaves.
5.1 Cross-enclave Prime+Probe (Vector 7)
Our exploration starts with a validation of cross-enclave cache
Prime+Probe attack. SGX is not designed to deal with cache side-
channel attacks. Therefore, it is expected that known cache attacks
also work against SGX enclaves. To confirm this, we ported GnuPG
1.4.13 to Graphene-SGX. The algorithm repeatedly decrypted a
ciphertext which was encrypted with a 3,072-bit ElGamal public
key, just as the prior work (i.e., [30]) did. GnuPG uses Wiener’s
table to decide subgroup sizes matching field sizes and adds a a
50% margin to the security parameters, consequently a private key
of 403 bits is used. In the experiment an attack process monitored
when the victim enclave was loaded and determined the physical
address of Square-and-Multiply exponentiation. With knowledge of
cache slicing and cache set mapping [24], the attacker constructed
eviction sets mapped to the same cache sets as the target addresses.
In our experiment, with the observation of only one ElGamal de-
cryption, we could recover all 403 bits of the private key through a
Prime+Probe cache attack with an error rate of 2.3%.
This experiment suggest that Prime+Probe cache attacks can be
performed in a cross-enclave scenario, similar to the traditional
settings. We note that Prime+Probe attacks achieves a spatial gran-
ularity of a cache set, which is 16KB on a processor with a 8196-set
LLC (see Table 1 and Table 7).
5.2 Cross-enclave DRAMA (Vector 8)
The DRAMA attack exploits shared DRAM rows to extract sensi-
tive information [36]. In such an attack, in order to learn whether
the victim process has accessed a virtual address d , the adversary
allocates two memory blocks that map to the same DRAM bank,
with one sharing the same DRAM row with the physical memory
of d , which we call p, and the other mapped to a different row on
the same bank, which we call p′. The attack is conducted using the
following steps:
• Access the memory block p′.
•Wait for some victim operations.
•Measure the access time of memory block p.
A faster memory access to memory block p suggests the vic-
tim process has probably touched memory address d during its
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Figure 5: Illustration of cache-DRAM attack.
operations. Of course, because the DRAM row is large (e.g., typi-
cally 8 KB), false detection is likely. Even so, DRAMA is shown to
effectively detect the existence of keystroke activities [36].
Directly applying DRAMA to perform cross-enclave attacks faces
several challenges, most of which are also faced by our design of
cache-DRAM attacks. Therefore, we defer the discussion of these
design challenges to Section 5.3 wherewe detail the cache-DRAMat-
tacks. Herewe enumerate some limitations of cross-enclaveDRAMA
attacks.
First, most of the victim’s memory access will be cached (EPC
is cacheable by default), and hence no information will be leaked
through the use of DRAM rows. While we could manually disable
cache by setting the cache disable (CD) bit of CR0 for the core
running the victim enclave3, this would slow down the enclave
process for approximately 1000×.
Second, DRAMA attacks may falsely detect row hits that are
unrelated to the victim enclave’s visit to d , because the 8KB DRAM
row can be shared by multiple data structure or code regions. This
false detection, however, is very common in our experiments.
Finally, DRAMA cannot achieve fine-grained spatial accuracy.
As an example, on our test system a memory page is distributed
over 4 DRAM rows. In an extreme case the attacker could occupy
an entire row except a single 1KB chunk for the victim enclave and
achieve a spatial accuracy of 1KB (see Table 7), which is better than
the Prime+Probe cache attack (16 KB), however still worse than a
Flush+Reload cache attack (64B).
5.3 Cache-DRAM Attacks (Vector 7 & 8)
To improve cross-enclave DRAMA attacks, we propose a novel
cache-DRAM attack. We show that by leveraging both vector 7 and
8, the adversary can significantly improve the spatial granularity
of memory side-channel attacks.
Techniques. Particularly, the cache-DRAM attack is performed
using two threads: one thread runs in non-enclave mode which
Prime+Probes a cache set in the last-level cache in which the
address d is mapped; the other thread conducts the cross-enclave
DRAMA without disabling caching. As the Prime+Probe attack
causes conflicts with d in the last-level cache, the victim enclave’s
3In Intel SGX programming reference [1] it is said that PRMRR_BASE register could
be programmed with values UC(0x0) to set PRM range as uncacheable. We confirmed
on our platform that PRMRR_BASE register cannot be changed after system boot.
Table 6: Row ranges for different PRM size.
PRM size PRM range DRAM row range
32MB 0x88000000∼0x89FFFFFF 0x1100∼0x113F
64MB 0x88000000∼0x8BFFFFFF 0x1100∼0x117F
128MB 0x80000000∼0x87FFFFFF 0x1000∼0x10FF
accesses of d will reach the DRAM. The concept of cache-DRAM
attack is shown in Figure 5. However, to implement cache-DRAM
attacks against SGX enclaves, one needs to address the following
challenges:
First, share the DRAM Bank and Row with d . The EPC memory
exclusively used by enclaves is already isolated from the rest of
the physical memory in DRAMs. To understand this artifact, we
explain the mechanism of the DRAM-level isolation using our own
testbed (Table 1) as an example. With the assumption of row bits
being the most significant bits in a physical address [36, 42], any
bit beyond bit 19 is a row bit that determines the corresponding
DRAM row of the physical address. With a 128MB PRM (physical
memory range 0x80000000 to 0x87FFFFFF), no non-PRM memory
will occupy row number 0x1000 to 0x10FF, as shown in Table 6. As
such, the PRM range (exclusively taken by enclaves) spans every
DRAM bank and occupies specific sets of rows in each bank; these
rows are not shared with non-PRM memory regions.
To overcome this barrier, we leverage the processor’s support for
running multiple enclave programs concurrently to carry out the
DRAMA attacks from another enclave program controlled by the
adversary. Since both programs operate inside enclaves, they share
the EPC memory range. The adversary can manage to co-locate the
memory page with the target enclave memory on the same banks
and even the same rows, as illustrated in Figure 5. Specifically, we
first identified the physical address of interest in the victim enclave.
This can be achieved by reading the page tables directly. Then we
allocated a large chunk of memory buffer in the spying enclave and
determined their physical addresses. Using the reverse-engineering
tool provided by the original DRAMA attack [36], we picked two
memory addressesp andp′, as stated above. The attack is illustrated
as in Figure 5. p and p′ are accessed in turns without any delay.
The access latency of memory block p is measured to determine
whether the target address d in the victim enclave has just been
visited.
Second, obtain fine-grained timers in enclaves. An unexpected
challenge in executing this attack is the lack of a reliable clock. The
SGXv1 processor family does not provide timing information within
an enclave: the instructions such as RDTSC and RDTSCP are not valid
for enclave programs. To measure time, a straightforward way is
making system calls, which is heavyweight, slow and inaccurate,
due to the variation in the time for processing EEXIT and calls.
A much more lightweight solution we come up with utilizes the
observation that an enclave process can access the memory outside
without mode-switch. Therefore we can reserve a memory buffer
for smuggling CPU cycle counts into the attack enclave. Specifically,
a thread outside the enclave continuously dumps the cycle counts to
the buffer and the attack thread inside continuously reads from the
buffer. Although the race condition between them brings in noise
occasionally due to our avoidance of mutex for supporting timely
interactions between the threads, most of the time we successfully
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Figure 6: Distribution of access latency for probing the same
row and a different row.
1 /*An input dependent branch from gap library */
2 Obj SumInt(Obj opL , Obj opR) {
3 // initialize temp variables
4 // ...
5
6 // adding two small integers
7 if( ARE_INTOBJS( opL , opR) ) {
8 if(SUM_INTOBJS(sum , opL , opR))
9 return sum;
10 cs = INT_INTOBJ(opL)+INT_INTOBJ(opR);
11 // ...
12 }
13 // adding one large integer and small integer
14 else if( IS_INTOBJ(opL) || IS_INTOBJ(opR) ) {
15 // ...
16 }
17 // add two large integers
18 else {
19 // ...
20 }
21 }
Figure 7: An input-dependent branch in Gap 4.8.6.
observed a timing difference between a row hit and a row conflict
when probing the target enclave addresses. We use this method to
measure the access latency of p.
Evaluation. First we evaluate the accuracy of the timer we build
for the attack. We designed a simple enclave process continuously
visiting d with clflush instruction forcing the memory accesses
to reach a DRAM row. An evaluator enclave utilized the timer to
measure the access latency of p (the address on the same row as d),
as well as the access latency of p′ (the address on a different row),
1 million times each. Figure 6 shows the distributions of the access
latency measured by the evaluator enclave during these accesses.
As we see here the cases of DRAM row hit can be easily identified
based on the timing difference observed through our timer (the
left-most part of its distribution).
As an example, we ported Gap 4.8.6 to Graphene-SGX, targeting
an input-dependent branch which is illustrated in Figure 7. Gap is a
software package implementing various algebra algorithms. It uses
a non-integer data type for values that cannot fit into 29 bits, other-
wise the values are stored as immediate integers. In our experiment
we had the victim enclave running the SumInt operation every 5
µs. We set the range for a row hit detection as within 400-426 cpu
cycles. To further reduce false positives brought by prefetching, we
disabled hardware prefetches on the victim core by updating MSR
0x1A4. With the cache-DRAM attack targeting the instructions in
line 8, our attack enclave could detect whether the branch in line 7
was taken with a probability of 14.6% and <1% false positive rate.
Table 7: Analysis of side-channel attack surfaces.
Vectors Accuracy AEX Slowdown
i/dCache Prime+Probe 2MB high high
L2 Cache Prime+Probe 128KB high high
L3 Cache Prime+Probe 16KB none modest
page faults 4KB high high
B/T-SPM 4KB modest modest
HT-SPM 4KB none modest
cross-enclave DRAMA 1KB none high
cache-DRAM 64B none minimal
Moreover, we only observed a 2% slowdown of enclave program in
our experiment.
Discussion. The cache-DRAM attack achieves a spatial accuracy
of 64 byte which is as accurate as the Flush+Reload cache attacks.
In the meanwhile it ensures that only the targeted cache set is
primed which further reduces the false positives caused by accesses
of shared DRAM rows. The attack can be more powerful for a
dedicated attacker by reserving a DRAM bank exclusively for the
victim and spying enclaves.
6 MITIGATION AND DISCUSSION
6.1 Analysis of Attack Surfaces
Table 7 summarizes the characteristics of the memory side-channel
attacks discovered over different vectors. The data here were col-
lected from the system configuration in Table 1 and a PRM size of
128MB. The value under the Accuracy column shows the spatial ac-
curacy of the attack vectors. For example, the iCache Prime+Probe
channel has an accuracy of 2MB (i.e., 128MB/64): that is, detecting
one cache miss in one of the iCache sets could probably mean any of
2MB of the physical memory being accessed. The larger the number
is, the coarser-grained the vector will be. The attack with the finest
granularity is the cache-DRAM attack, which is 64 bytes, equivalent
to the Flush+Reload cache attacks. However, note that due to lack
of shared memory pages—as EPC pages only belong to one enclave
at a time—Flush+Reload cache attacks are not feasible on SGX
enclaves. It is also worth noting that the calculation of the accuracy
does not consider knowledge of the physical memory exclusively
used by the target enclave. This information can help improve the
granularity even further. Prime+Probe cache attacks on iCache,
dCache and L2 cache induce high volume of AEXs. This does not
take HyperThreading into consideration. If so, both AEX numbers
and slowdowns will become modest. Most of the attack vectors that
need to frequently preempt the enclave execution will induce high
overheads. The cross-enclave DRAMA needs to disable cache to
conduct effective attacks, therefore inducing high slowdown. What
is not shown in the table is temporal observabilities. Except for page-
fault attacks, all other attacks have temporal observabilities, as they
allow observing finer-grained information than allowed by their
basic information unit, which are leaked through timing signals.
Other attack vectors not listed. Flush+Reload cache attacks
against cached PTE entries are one attack vector that we have not
listed in Table 7. As a PTE entry shares cache line with 7 more
PTE entries, the spatial accuracy is 4KB×8 = 32KB. The attack can
achieve the spatial accuracy of 4KB if PTE entries are intentionally
organized. Combining SPM and DRAMA attacks will also introduce
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a new attack vector. We did not show these attacks due to the
similarity to the ones we demonstrated.
6.2 Effectiveness of Existing Defenses
Deterministicmultiplexing. Shinde et al. [39] proposes a compiler-
based approach to opportunistically place all secret-dependent con-
trol flows and data flows into the same pages, so that page-level
attacks will not leak sensitive information. However, this approach
does not consider cache side channels or DRAM side channels,
leaving the defense vulnerable to cache attacks and DRAMA.
Hiding page faults with transactional memory. T-SGX [38]
prevents information leakage about page faults inside enclaves by
encapsulating the program’s execution inside hardware-supported
memory transactions. Page faults will cause transaction aborts,
which will be handled by abort handler inside the enclave first. The
transaction abort handler will notice the abnormal page fault and
decide whether to forward the control flow to the untrusted OS
kernel. As such, the page fault handler can only see that the page
fault happens on the page where the abort handler is located (via
register CR2). The true faulting address is hidden.
However, T-SGX cannot prevent the accessed flags enabled mem-
ory side-channel attacks. According to Intel Software Developer’s
manual [3], transaction abort is not strictly enforced when the ac-
cessed flags and dirty flags of the referenced page table entries are
updated. This means there is no security guarantee that memory
access inside transactional region is not leaked through updates of
the page table entries.
Secure processor design. Sanctum [16] is a new hardware de-
sign that aims to protect against both last-level cache attacks and
page-table based attacks. As Sanctum enclave has its own page
tables, page access patterns become invisible to the malicious OS.
Therefore, the page-faults attacks and SPM attacks will fail. How-
ever, Sanctum does not prevent cross-enclave DRAMA attack. As
a matter of fact, Sanctum still relies on the OS to assign DRAM
regions to enclaves, create page table entries and copy code and
data into the enclave during enclave initialization. Since OS knows
the exact memory layout of the enclave, the attacker can therefore
run an attack process in a different DRAM region that shares a
same DRAM row as the target enclave address.
Timed execution. Chen et al. [15] proposes a compiler-based ap-
proach, called DÉJÀVU, to measure the execution time of an enclave
program at the granularity of basic blocks in a control-flow graph.
Execution time larger than a threshold indicates that the enclave
code has been interrupted and AEX has occurred. The intuition
behind it is that execution time measured at the basic block level
will not suffer from the variations caused by different inputs. Due
to the lack of timing measurements in SGX v1 enclaves, DÉJÀ VU
constructs a software clock inside the enclave which is encapsu-
lated inside Intel Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX).
Therefore, the clock itself will not be interrupted without being
detected. It was shown that DÉJÀ VU can detect AEX with high
fidelity. Therefore, any of the side-channel attack vectors that in-
duce high volume of AEX will be detected by DÉJÀ VU. However,
those not involving AEX in the attacks, such as T-SPM or HT-SPM
attacks will bypass DÉJÀ VU completely.
EnclaveAddress Space LayoutRandomization. SGX-Shield [37]
implemented fine-grained ASLRwhen an enclave program is loaded
into the SGX memory. However the malicious OS could still learn
the memory layout after observing memory access patterns in a
long run as SGX-Shield does not support live re-randomization.
6.3 Lessons Learned
Our analysis of SGX memory side channels brings to light new
attack surfaces and new capabilities the adversary has. Here are a
few thoughts about how to mitigate such risks on the SGX platform,
and more generically, for the emerging TEE.
SGX application development. Our research shows that the ad-
versary can achieve fine-grained monitoring of an enclave process,
through not only pages and cache channels, but also inter-page
timing, cross-enclave DRAM and HyperThreading. It is important
for the SGX developer to realize the impacts of these new attack
surfaces, which is critical for building enclave applications to avoid
leaks through the new channels. For example, she can no longer
hide her secret by avoiding page-level access patterns, since intra-
or inter-page timings can also disclose her sensitive information.
Software-level protection. Defense against SGX side-channel
leaks can no longer rely on the assumptions we have today. Partic-
ularly, such attacks do not necessarily cause an anomalously high
AEX rate. Blending sensitive information into the same memory
pages is not effective against attacks with finer spatial granular-
ity. Also, the adversary may also use a combination of multiple
channels to conduct more powerful attacks.
Hardware enhancement.Most memory side channels we know
so far can be mitigated through hardware changes, e.g., partitions
of caches/DRAM and keeping enclave page tables inside EPC, etc.
In some cases, such changes could be the best option. Further re-
search is expected to better understand the issue and the impacts
of the related side channels, making the case to Intel and other TEE
manufacturers for providing hardware-level supports.
Big picture.Over years, we observe thatmany side-channel studies
follow a similar pattern: a clever attack is discovered and then
researchers immediately embark on the defense against the attack.
However, in retrospection, most defense proposals fail to consider
the bigger picture behind the demonstrated attacks, thus they are
unable to offer effective protection against the adversary capable
of quickly adjusting strategies, sometimes not even meaningfully
raising the bar to the variations of the attacks. The ongoing research
on SGX apparently succumbs to the same pitfalls. We hope that
our study can serve as a new start point for rethinking the ongoing
effort on SGX security, inspiring the follow-up efforts to better
understand the fundamental limitations of this new TEE and the
ways we can use it effectively and securely.
7 RELATEDWORK
Paging-based side channels. It has been shown in previous stud-
ies that page-level memory access patterns can leak secrets of en-
clave programs under a variety of scenarios [39, 43]. This type of
leakage is enabled by enforcing page faults during enclave’s exe-
cution, by marking selected memory pages to be non-present or
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non-executable. As such, data accesses or code execution in these
pages will be trapped into the OS kernel, and the malicious OS will
learn which page is accessed by the enclave program. Page-fault
side-channel attack is one attack vector of the memory side-channel
attack surface we explore in this paper.
Concurrently and independently, Van et al. also propose paging-
based attacks on SGX. They report two attacks: one exploits the
updates of accessed flags (Vector 4) and dirty flags (Vector 5) of the
referenced PTEs, and the other is a Flush+Flush or Flush+Reload
side-channel attack on the referenced PTEs (Vector 3).
Although similar to our approach in terms of utilizing the ac-
cessed flags to avoid page faults, the attack proposed has not been
designed to be truly stealthy, minimizing interrupts produced when
it is executed. Actually, it can introduce evenmore AEXs, as demon-
strated by their evaluation, rendering the attack less effective in
the presence of existing protection, such as T-SGX [38] and DÉJÀ
VU [15]. By comparison, our research reveals multiple avenues to
reduce the interrupt frequencies, showing that a paging attack can
be made stealthy when it is used together with timings or TLB
flushing through HyperThreading, thwarting all existing defense.
Further, our study also highlights other side-channel vectors in SGX
memory management, providing evidence for the credible threats
they pose (i.e., the Cache-DRAM attacks).
Branch prediction side channels. A very recent study explores
branch prediction units as side channels to infer sensitive control
flows inside SGX enclaves [28]. The memory side-channel attack
surface does not include attack vectors through branch prediction.
Both are important to the understanding of side-channel security
of SGX.
Cache SideChannels. Cache side-channel attacks under the threat
model we consider in this paper (i.e., access driven attacks [19])
have been demonstrated on x86 architectures, including data caches
(and also per-core L2 unified caches) [19, 21, 32, 34, 35, 40], instruc-
tion caches [8, 9, 47], and inclusive LLCs [12, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29,
30, 33, 44–46, 48]. Some recent studies [14, 17, 20, 31] have shown
that the above side channels are still feasible on SGX enclaves. We
briefly confirmed the effectiveness of cache side-channel attacks in
our paper, while the focus of this work is a broader attack surface
than caches.
SGX Side-Channel Defenses.Most known defenses are designed
specifically to page-fault side-channel attacks. Shinde et al. [39]
proposed a compiler-based approach to transform cryptographic
programs to hide page access patterns that may leak information.
Shih et al. [38] proposed T-SGX which exploits Intel Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) to prevent page faults from re-
vealing the faulting address. Costan et al. [16] proposed a secure
enclave architecture that is similar to SGX but resilient to both page-
fault and cache side-channel attacks. Chen et al. [15] proposed DÉJÀ
VU, a compiler-based approach to instrument enclave programs
so that they can measure their own execution time between basic
blocks in their control-flow graph. These research prototypes were
designed without fully understanding the memory side-channel
attack surface, thus fall short in offering effective protection against
the attacks demonstrated in this work.
8 CONCLUSION
We report the first in-depth study of SGX memory side channels in
the paper. Our study summarizes 8 attack vectors in memory man-
agement, ranging from TLB to DRAM. Further we demonstrate a set
of novel attacks that exploit these channels, by leveraging accessed
flags, timing, HyperThreating and DRAM modules. Compared with
the page-fault attack, the new attacks are found to be stealthier and
much more lightweight, with effectiveness comparable with the
known attack in some cases. Most importantly, our study broadens
the scope of side-channel studies on SGX, reveals the gap between
proposed defense and the design weaknesses of the system, and
can provoke the further discussion on how to use the new TEE
techniques effectively and securely.
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